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This paper identifies opportunities for potential theoretical and practical improvements in employees’ awareness
of cybersecurity and their motivational behavior to protect themselves and their organizations from cyberattacks
using the protection motivation theory. In addition, it contributes to the literature by examining additional
variables and mediators besides the core constructs of the Protection Motivation Model (PMT). This article uses
empirical data and structural equation modeling to test the antecedents and mediators of employees’ cyberse
curity motivational behavior. The study offers theoretical and pragmatic guidance for cybersecurity programs.
First, the model developed in this study can partially explain how people may change their cybersecurity pro
tection behavior about security threats and coping actions. Secondly, the result of the study indicates that se
curity coping factors are reliable predictors in projecting individual intention to take protective measures. Third,
organizational effort in combatting cyber threats and increasing employee awareness is significantly associated
with the use of cyber threat coping processes. Additionally, several practical prescriptions are suggested based on
gender, generations, and types of organizations. For example, government organizations have taken welldesigned cybersecurity measures and developed detailed protocols to enhance employees’ motivational
behavior. Finally, future cybersecurity training materials should adapt to the unique traits of different genera
tions, especially the Gen Edge group and digital natives for all cybersecurity subjects.

1. Introduction
In a digital era, technologies, such as computer systems, the Internet,
and smart devices, play a fundamental role in everyday life across so
cieties. While we enjoy the convenience and efficiency of the new
technologies, we face new risks and threats caused by using technology.
In recent years, businesses in all industries and of all sizes have expe
rienced the increased frequency, volume, and sophistication of cyberattacks (Lu & Xu, 2018). For example, on May 7, 2021, an American
oil supply system, Colonial Pipeline, suffered a ransomware cyberattack
that impacted computerized equipment managing the pipeline. In
response, Colonial Pipeline Company halted all of the pipeline’s oper
ations and then paid the requested ransom of nearly $5 million to restore
its network (McMillan et al., 2021). According to Global Risks Report
2016, cybercrime costed 100 billion dollars in the U.S. in 2014 (Bay
Dynamics, 2016). Since information security management is a necessity
for all organizations (Haqaf & Koyuncu, 2018; Li et al., 2014, 2019; Liu
et al., 2020; Safi et al., 2021), managers of all industries have considered
company’s cybersecurity a top priority in their risk management agenda

(Grauer, 2016; IBM Security, 2020). Gartner Inc. estimated that the
worldwide spending on cybersecurity would reach $170 billion by 2020
(Morgan, 2015). Much of this resource will be spent on training em
ployees who are an essential line of defense. Therefore, it is critical to
motivate employees to enhance their cybersecurity compliance
behavior.
A critical measure in preventing cyber threats is to find effective and
feasible ways to encourage employees and end-users of various tech
nologies to effectively protect their individual and organizational in
formation assets. Different research models and theoretical frameworks
have been applied to promote security compliance (Xu et al., 2021). For
example, Boss et al. (2015) have outlined several models ranging from
general deterrence theory (Herath & Rao, 2009b; Hu et al., 2012), the
Health Belief Model (Ng et al., 2009), rational choice theory (Bulgurcu
et al., 2010; Hu et al., 2011), to the protection motivation theory
(Crossler et al., 2014; Sun et al., 2020) that have been applied to analyze
cybersecurity behavior. Among them, the Protection Motivation Theory
(PMT) has been found to be a very relevant theoretical model in pre
dicting individual intention to take information security actions (Yoo
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et al., 2021). Previous studies (Wall & Warkentin, 2019; Wu, 2020) have
applied some components of PMT to examine how employees’ security
threat perception may impact an individual’s intention to practice safe
behavior, but only a few of these studies have presented a comprehen
sive view on the actual security protection action influenced by the PMT
theory (Boss et al., 2015).
In responding to the malicious attacks of the information breach and
Internet hacking, information security professionals and researchers are
developing measures to help understand the effect of security threats on
individual employee’s behavior (D’Arcy et al., 2014; Herath and Rao,
2009a; Hu et al., 2012; Posey et al., 2015; Wu, 2020). While the results
of these studies have provided useful insights, they (Anderson et al.,
2016; Ho et al., 2016; Menard et al., 2017; Wu, 2020) tend to place
emphasis on individual’s intention and are not sufficient to provide
sound advice for organizations to understand the effects of environ
mental or organizational security awareness on the behavior of their
employees. The need for theoretical and pragmatic guidance in the
design and implementation of cybersecurity programs is urgent. Orga
nizations must continually seek better direction to develop effective
cybersecurity programs to combat the dangerous behaviors associated
with employees’ motivation toward cybersecurity action. Although
much research has been done to test some of the constructs of the PMT
model with regards to the threat appraisal and coping appraisal, an
overarching integrated model is still lacking. Boss et al. (2015) sug
gested that researchers should make an effort to examine the variables in
the PMT model.
The purpose of this paper is to identify opportunities for potential
theoretical and practical improvements in the area of employees’
awareness of cybersecurity and motivational behavior using the pro
tection motivation theory. The research objective is (1) to investigate
the comprehensive impact of threat and coping assessments as medi
ating factors of the PMT model on employee’s cybersecurity protection
action; (2) to explore the role of organizational information security
practices as an antecedent on the behavior of their employees; and (3) to
study the effects of demographic factors, such as gender and genera
tions, on employee’s cybersecurity behavior.
This paper contributes to the growing body of literature on the
employee behavior towards IS security in the following ways: (1) it
contributes to the literature through developing and testing an over
arching protection motivation theoretical model that uses organization
cybersecurity effort as antecedent and threat appraisal and coping
appraisal as mediators in the information security area; (2) it not only
identifies and proposes theoretically and empirically addressable
research questions but also provides improved model-fit statistics when
compared to models that did not include the complete set of PMT’s core
constructs; (3) it identifies unique cybersecurity behavior of various
generations, such as Baby Boomer, Generation X, Millennial, and Gen
Edge. To our knowledge, the previous studies have not looked into the
unique cybersecurity behaviors related to generations, though studies
on age groups have been conducted; (4) it integrates organizational ef
forts to the employee’s cybersecurity awareness and motivational
behavior, not just intentions; (5) it suggests that previous inconclusive
findings on the information security behavior between male and female
employees are due to the aggregated information; when the data are
broken down to detailed analysis, behavioral differences emerge; and
(6) the correlation between the awareness of existing cybersecurity
policy and employee’s cybersecurity protection actions is discussed.
In the next section, research findings related to cybersecurity threats
and the PMT model are examined. We then present an extended theo
retical framework of the Protection Motivation Model suggested by
Rogers (1975, 1983) in a cybersecurity environment. Our extended
theoretical framework appears to offer a more relevant explanation of
how organizational cybersecurity practices can enhance their em
ployees’ cybersecurity actions.

2. Background and literature
2.1. Cybersecurity threats
Cyber threats are getting more sophisticated and intense amid the
increasing levels of remote work, virtual conferencing, and dependence
on digital devices. Web applications and cloud computing vulnerabil
ities are ranked at the top of cybersecurity threats. The global market for
web applications and cloud computing is estimated to grow 17% to
reach the cost of $266 billion in 2020 (Gartner, 2019). As the pandemic
lasted, the economy also witnessed a 50% increase in cloud use across all
industries. The five leading cybersecurity threats identified are (i) social
engineering and phishing attempts, (ii) ransomware, (iii) DDoS attacks,
(iv) third-party software, and (v) cloud computing vulnerabilities
(Gurinaviciute, 2021).
In a world connected by information highways, no organization is
immune from cyberattacks and data breaches. A cybersecurity threat is
the threat of a malicious attack by an individual or organization
attempting to access a network to corrupt data or steal confidential in
formation. Some cyberattacks can even destroy computer systems or
paralyze the supply chain operation, such as a recent incident that
happened to Colonial Pipeline, which disrupted gasoline delivery across
parts of the southeastern U.S. (McMillan et al., 2021). As cyber threats
become increasingly sophisticated, organizations should enhance their
employees’ awareness of damages caused by cyberattacks and provide
training to improve employees’ security protection efficacy to safeguard
their data and information networks.
The cybersecurity threat posed by vulnerable web applications has
been ranked as the most severe by IT professionals. Thus, it is essential
for enterprises to develop cybersecurity awareness and training pro
grams, such as cybersecurity-related policy enforcement procedures
(Chen & He, 2013; Sen & Borle, 2015; Wu, 2020), mandated training
(D’Arcy et al., 2009), and security communication and computer
monitoring (D’Arcy et al., 2014) to improve employee’s cybersecurity
behavior.
Although technology-related factors are essential, behavioral factors
are vital contributing factors to cybersecurity protection because
humans develop, manage, and use the technology. Siponen and Vance
(2010) noted that most users do not fully comply with cybersecurity
policies. In recent years, incidents of insider threats such as intentional
and unintentional leaking and theft of valuable data have been reported.
According to the Cost of Data Breach Report (IBM Security, 2020), about
thirty-six percent of substantial cybersecurity breaches are caused by
insiders or employees’ compliance failures, remote work, and security
skill shortages.
2.2. Protection motivation theory
The current version of the Protection Motivation Theory model
(PMT) is rooted in the earlier work of Rogers (1975). The PMT model
provides a clear prescription for developing messages that can influence
adaptive behavior to threats. Our discussion is based on published
literature on the PMT model (Floyd et al., 2000; Roger, 1983; Yoo et al.,
2021).
The core components of the PMT model are the threat appraisal and
coping appraisal processes that shape motivational behavior. The basic
idea of the PMT is that a threat triggers the threat-appraisal process
(Floyd et al., 2000); in our case, it is a cybersecurity threat. The PMT
model suggests five core constructs that influence individuals who
intend to protect themselves: (1) The perceived dangerousness of
cyber-attack incident (e.g., having one’s computer infected by a virus as
a result of opening a suspicious email attachment); (2) the perceived
likelihood of being vulnerable to malicious assault (e.g., vulnerable to
being attacked by a phishing email); (3) the perceived response efficacy
(e.g., carry out recommended preventive procedures); (4) The perceived
self-efficacy (e.g., an employee’s belief in her ability to perform the
2
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prescribed procedures successfully), and (5) the response costs (e.g.,
complying with the information security policies to keep security
breaches down).
The threat appraisal and coping appraisal processes mediate the
instigation, sustenance, and guidance of protective behavior (Floyd
et al., 2000). The appraisal of the threat and different coping responses
lead to motivational behavior to perform adaptive responses. Mal
adaptive responses include behaviors that are considered negative, such
as opening up an unknown attachment and ignoring training, which will
lead to negative consequences.
The Protection Motivation Theory is a well-accepted theoretical
model for examining and analyzing the behaviors or actions recom
mended to negate the harm related to threats. PMT has been validated in
research conducted in healthcare (Milne et al., 2000), psychology (Floyd
et al., 2000), information technology (Sun et al., 2020; Wall & War
kentin, 2019), and other disciplines. In the application domain of
computer and information security, PMT is naturally suited for infor
mation security contexts in which employees and end-users require
additional motivation to protect their information assets. Several in
formation security studies that use PMT as the primary theoretical
model have been published recently (Anderson & Agarwal, 2010; Boss
et al., 2015; Sun et al., 2020; Wu, 2020). For example, by integrating
PMT, the Theory of Reasoned Action (TRA), and the Cognitive Evalua
tion Theory (CET), Siponen et al. (2009) develop a model to explore the
factors that impact employees’ intentions to comply with information
security policies. Based on the PMT concept, Johnston and Warkentin
(2010) proposed a Fear Appeals Model (FAM) to estimate the degree
that fear appeals can influence an end user’s compliance. They
concluded that end users’ behavioral intentions to adopt prescribed
security policies are affected by fear appeals.
Boss et al. (2015) reviewed 28 publications that had applied the PMT
model in the area of cybersecurity; they found out that 19 out of 28
studies have missed some of the core constructs of the PMT model (for
example, perceived severity, perceived vulnerability, perceived
response efficacy, perceived self-efficacy, and response costs). In addi
tion, none of them examined the actual cybersecurity behaviors. How
ever, some recent studies have tried to study actual cybersecurity
behavior using experiments. For example, Van Bavel et al. (2019)
designed a mock purchasing process to test the level of security of par
ticipants’ online behavior. Another study was conducted by Jansen and
Van Schaik (2019). They examined the impact of fear appeal messages
on user cognitions, attitudes, behavioral attentions, and precautionary
behavior regarding online information-sharing to protect against the
threat of phishing attacks. This development calls for an extension to the
PMT model to reflect the unique behavior when applied to the infor
mation security setting and provide theoretical justification for using the

model. In this study, we will address this issue using empirical data.
2.3. From motivation to action: extending Protection Motivation Model in
cybersecurity study
In this study, we extend the PMT model by mediating organizational
effort and actual employee cybersecurity behavior with the threat
appraisal process and the coping appraisal process. Fig. 1 presents a
theoretical model of extended perspective on cybersecurity behavior.
We draw insights from Rogers’ Protective Motivation Theory (Rogers,
1975; 1983) and the PMT model suggested by Floyd et al. (Floyd et al.,
2000 and Boss et al., 2015). Our extended protection motivation con
ceptual framework includes three parts. First, we consider the organi
zational effort to fight cybersecurity crime as an antecedent of threat and
coping appraisals. The rationale to include organizational effort is that
many organizations have increased reliance on information systems for
processing and storing information (Wu, 2020) and commutating with
their suppliers and customers. Secondly, adopted from Rogers’ model
(Roger 1983), we consider two cognitive mediating processes: the
threat-appraisal process and the coping-appraisal process. And finally,
the employee’s protective behavior, the construct on the right-hand side
of Fig. 1, is the dependent variable of the cognitive mediating process
that includes threat and coping appraisal attributes. We included that
employees’ motivational behavior results from cognitive mediating
processes since researchers (Boss et al., 2015) suggested that cyberse
curity studies should explore the importance of employees’ cyberse
curity behavior rather than an intention. This study focuses on
employees’ self-reported cybersecurity motivational behavior. Table 1
provides a summary of the constructs, the related theoretical concepts,
and relevant references.
2.4. Organizational cybersecurity practice and its effect on employee
awareness
Johnston and Warkentin (2010) find that social influence such as
information from organizations positively affects individuals’ intentions
to adopt cybersecurity programs. When an organization has cyberse
curity procedures or policies in place, its employees are provided with
information security training and cybersecurity tips. According to pub
lished literature (Herath & Rao, 2009b; Posey et al., 2015), extrinsic
motivators, such as social influence, peers, and descriptive norms,
enrich employees’ experience and positively impact employees’ cyber
security behavior. Previous studies (D’Arcy et al., 2014; Herath & Rao,
2009b; Venkatesh et al., 2003) in the cybersecurity framework indicate
that employees are motivated to behave the same way their peers do. It
is commonly accepted that “cybersecurity awareness refers to

Fig. 1. Extended PMT model for antecedents and mediating factors on cybersecurity actions.
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assessment process evaluates the maladaptive behaviors, which have
two constructs – severity and vulnerability (Boss et al., 2015; Roger,
1983). Severity is the degree to which an employee believes that a
cybersecurity threat, such as a computer virus, unauthorized access to a
computer, or Internet hacking, will cause consequential harm. Perceived
severity refers to the extent to which individuals perceive the magnitude
of a threat and the potential impact of a threat (Ng & Xu, 2007; Vance
et al., 2012). Accordingly, we argue that employees’ awareness of
cybersecurity helps them better understand the severity of cyber threats
than those who do not have a similar experience (Ajzen, 2011; Ali et al.,
2021; Herath & Rao, 2009a). Thus, we study the following Hypothesis.

Table 1
Constructs in the model.
Constructs

Theory

References

Organizational
information security
effort
Employee
cybersecurity
awareness
Perceived severity

OE

Herath & Rao, 2009a; Ali et al.,
2021

TPB

Perceived vulnerability

PMT

Ajzen (2011); Herath & Rao,
2009a; IBM Security, 2020; Ali
et al., 2021
Boss et al., 2015; Floyd et al.,
2000; Herath & Rao, 2009a;
Rogers, 1983; Wall & Warkentin,
2019; Wu, 2020; Yoo et al., 2021;
Ali et al., 2021
Boss et al., 2015; Herath and Rao,
2009b; Lee & Larsen, 2009; Ng
et al., 2007; Wall & Warkentin,
2019; Wu, 2020; Yoo et al., 2021;
Ali et al., 2021
Boss et al., 2015; Crossler &
Bélanger, 2014; Lee & Larsen,
2009; Wall & Warkentin, 2019;
Wu, 2020; Yoo et al., 2021; Ali
et al., 2021
Boss et al., 2015; Crossler &
Bélanger, 2014; Herath & Rao,
2009a; Lee & Larsen, 2009; Wall
& Warkentin, 2019; Wu, 2020;
Yoo et al., 2021; Ali et al., 2021
Boss et al., 2015; Crossler &
Bélanger, 2014; Herath & Rao,
2009a; Menard et al., 2017; Ali
et al., 2021
Boss et al., 2015; Floyd et al.,
2000; Wall & Warkentin, 2019;
IBM Security, 2020

Protection
Motivation Theory
(PMT)

Response efficacy

PMT

Self-efficacy

PMT

Response costs

Cybersecurity behavior

PMT

TPB, PMT

Hypothesis 2a. Employees’ cybersecurity awareness is positively
related to their perceived severity of cybersecurity incidents.
Vulnerability means the degree to which an employee believes that
cyber threat applies to his or her specific circumstances (Boss et al.,
2015). Vulnerability is the probability that an unwanted incident will
happen in the absence of preventive action (Vance et al., 2012). If em
ployees previously suffered from cybersecurity breaches or data loss due
to cyber hacking, they tend to take specific actions to prevent
cyber-attack. This discussion leads us to formulate the following
Hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2b. Employees’ cybersecurity awareness is positively
related to their perceived vulnerability caused by cybersecurity
incidents.
A coping appraisal process is about how individuals evaluate their
abilities to manage the potential loss or damage arising from a threat
(Woon et al., 2005). In our case, it is a cybersecurity threat. A coping
appraisal is a measure that comprises three constructs: response efficacy,
self-efficacy, and response cost of performing the adaptive actions
(Rogers, 1983). Response efficacy is a belief that the adaptive response
will work if one takes a protective measure to protect the company
(Anderson et al., 2010). For example, an employee believes that his
compliance with the company’s information security policies would
reduce security breaches.
On the other hand, self-efficacy is the degree to which an individual
believes that he can cope with threats, such as having confidence in
removing spyware from his electronic devices and treating virusinfected files (Ng & Xu, 2007; Sun et al., 2020). We argue that in
dividuals’ self-efficacy comes from their motivation and awareness. The
more experience and higher motivation they have, the more confident
they will carry out coping response tasks. From this argument, we offer
these hypotheses:

employees’ understanding of the nature of cybersecurity threats, how
threats can jeopardize organizational security, and what employees
should do if they encounter a threat” (Minecast, 2021). The PMT model
explicitly suggests that an employee’s security awareness is a primary
factor for threat appraisal and coping processes (Vance et al., 2013).
Therefore, organization effort in enhancing employee’s cybersecurity
awareness can help employee’s subsequent security behavior.
Several authors have explored the effects of security awareness
programs conducted by organizations. However, the results are incon
clusive. After they tested a theoretical model of the incentive effects of
penalties, pressures, and perceived effectiveness of employee actions
(Herath & Rao, 2009a), Herath and Rao found that employees’ cyber
security behaviors are influenced by intrinsic and extrinsic motivators.
On the contrary, Ng and Xu (2007) found that higher levels of cue to
action do not necessarily improve employees’ cybersecurity behavior. In
recent years, especially after the Snowden incident, specific employee
cybersecurity behaviors have been identified. Many organizations are
implementing cybersecurity procedures such as providing training,
distributing security newsletters, and sending alert messages to em
ployees to fight against cyber hacking and other information leaks. We
suspect that the development in cybersecurity practices has enhanced
employees’ awareness of security protection. We propose the following
Hypothesis.

Hypothesis 2c. Employees’ cybersecurity awareness is positively
related to their response efficacy when they handle cybersecurity
incidents.
Hypothesis 2d. Employees’ cybersecurity awareness is positively
related to their self-efficacy when they handle cybersecurity incidents.
Finally, response costs are any perceived direct personal costs, such as
effort, inconvenience, or money incurred when an employee takes
protective steps. Response costs usually include individuals’ perceived
cost and inconvenience of practicing cybersecurity compliance. In our
study, the response cost can be backing up a computer regularly or
changing the password frequently. An individual’s response cost is
associated with his cybersecurity awareness. The more security experi
ence an employee has, the less often response costs will occur because he
is capable of practicing cybersecurity tasks. Thus, we expect:

Hypothesis 1. Organizations’ cybersecurity efforts are positively
related to their employees’ cybersecurity awareness.
2.5. The mediating process - cybersecurity threat appraisal and coping
appraisal

Hypothesis 2e. Employees’ cybersecurity awareness negatively af
fects their response costs.

The PMT model consists of two mediating processes: the threatappraisal process and the coping-appraisal process. These two pro
cesses are mapped to the cognitive processes that people apply to
evaluate threats and select coping alternatives. In addition, a threat

The output of the appraisal-mediating processes is an effective driver
for behavioral decisions. Thus, one of the dependent variables of a PMT
model is the measure of behavioral intentions or positive behavior. The
4
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purpose of PMT applied to information security research is usually to
persuade people to develop protective cybersecurity behavior. This
leads to our discussion on employee cybersecurity protection behavior
in the next section.

Siponen et al., 2014; Vance et al., 2012). Thus, we expect:
Hypothesis 3d. Stronger self-efficacy toward cybersecurity leads to
more assertive motivational behavior to comply with the security
policies.
There is a negative relationship between response cost and security
protection behavior. The higher the perceived response costs, the less
likely employees exhibit a greater level of cybersecurity protection
behavior (Ng & Xu, 2007). To validate this finding, we propose:

2.6. Cybersecurity motivational behavior
Protective Motivation Theory offers adequate explanatory power
and is considered by researchers to be one of the valuable guidelines to
estimate an individual’s commitment to engaging in risk protective ac
tions (Anderson et al., 2016; Floyd, 2000; Yoo, 2021). While most prior
cybersecurity studies choose behavioral intention or likelihood of
behavior as their dependent variables, we attempt to measure em
ployees’ practice in cyber risk management programs to explore the
predictive power of employees’ perceived severity, perceived vulnera
bility, response efficacy, self-efficacy, and responsive costs on their
cybersecurity protection behaviors. Ajzen (2011) articulated the theory
of planned behavior (TPB) that connects beliefs to behavior. He sug
gested that perceived behavioral control leads to actions. TPB has been
applied to a few information security studies regarding behavioral re
lations among attitudes, motivation, intentions, and behavioral
outcomes.
Published research has provided some insights on using compliance
behavior as a dependent variable. Herath and Rao (2009b) find that
employees’ security concerns are significantly impacted by the
perceived severity of cyber-attack. D’Arcy et al. (2009, 2014), on the
other hand, noted that information system misuse could effectively be
reduced by employees’ perceived severity of sanctions. Ng and Xu
(2007) suggested that individuals with higher levels of perceived
severity do not exhibit more significant levels of risk agility. Based on
these diverse findings, we intend to test the effects of perceived severity
on cybersecurity protection behavior and propose the following
Hypothesis:

Hypothesis 3e. Stronger perceived response costs toward cyberse
curity negatively affects motivational behavior to comply with the se
curity policies.
2.7. Effects of demographic factors
Gender Difference. We also intend to explore the moderating effect
of gender. Previous research has found that males and females act
differently when dealing with technologies, and women represent a
distinct voice in business ethics as gendered phenomena (Grosser et al.,
2017). Women tend to recognize unethical actions better and behave
more ethically when coping with IT-related wrongdoings (Cronan et al.,
2005). In addition, women are more likely to report cybersecurity in
fractions than males (Mesmer-Magnus et al., 2005; Stylianou et al.,
2013).
However, the previous findings of the role of gender in cybersecurity
management are inconclusive. Some scholars find that gender affects
decision-making processes regarding the issues related to information
systems (Adam & Ofori-Amanfo, 2000; Kreie & Cronan, 1998; Peslak,
2008); some scholars find that gender does not impact individuals’ in
tentions to violate cybersecurity policies (Barlow et al., 2013; Hovav &
D’Arcy, 2012; Siponen & Vance, 2010; Vance et al., 2012); and some
scholars find that females had significantly higher security compliance
intentions. Because the published literature provides inconclusive re
sults, we take a step further to provide in-depth analysis and expect
gender differences exist in our data. The following Hypothesis will be
tested.

Hypothesis 3a. Stronger perceived severity toward cybersecurity
leads to more assertive motivational behavior to comply with the se
curity policies.

Hypothesis 4a. Women have a higher level of awareness of cyberse
curity severity than men when encountering cybersecurity issues.

Vance et al. (2012) find that employees’ perceived vulnerability does
not positively affect their intention to comply with cybersecurity pol
icies. However, Siponen et al. (2014) find that employees’ perceived
vulnerability significantly and positively impacts their intent to abide by
the organization’s risk management policies. In order to provide a
consistent result to this issue, we intend to test the effects of perceived
vulnerability on cybersecurity protection behavior and propose the
following Hypothesis:

Type of Organization. Businesses and government organizations
have different organizational goals and business values. The former aims
to increase revenue or earn more profit by providing goods and services
to satisfy customer needs and stakeholders’ expectations, whereas the
latter aims to maintain domestic tranquility, achieve sustainable
development, and promote general welfare and economic growth (Kim
et al., 2014). For example, millions of US federal workers worked from
their homes because of the Coronavirus pandemic. This expansive tel
ecommuting activity has increased the potential of sensitive government
projects and information being exposed to unauthorized individuals.
Therefore, the government agencies require federal employees only use
agency-approved video conferencing, collaboration tools and methods
to share files, only use laptops and smartphones owned, managed and
protected by the government agency that the employee works for, store
work-related content on Government Furnished Equipment (GFE) and
agency-approved cloud services (Federal Mobility Group, 2020). On the
other hand, employees of a business organization, though also need to
comply with the company’s cybersecurity guideline, can use their own
electric devices when they work from home and print documents at
home if they needed. Due to the different goals, business firms and
government organizations provide fundamentally different environ
ments regarding cybersecurity. Therefore, we expect that differences
exist in different types of organizations and will test the following
Hypothesis.

Hypothesis 3b. Stronger perceived vulnerability toward cyberse
curity leads to more assertive motivational behavior to comply with the
security policies.
Literature shows that employees’ response efficacy significantly af
fects their attitudes towards cybersecurity policies (Herath & Rao,
2009b). Moreover, Johnston and Warkentin (2010) find that employees’
response efficacy positively affects their intentions to adopt cyberse
curity actions. However, some authors find that employees’ response
efficacy does not positively affect their choice to comply with cyber risk
management guidelines (Siponen et al., 2014; Vance et al., 2012). Based
on the inconsistent findings, we propose:
Hypothesis 3c. Stronger response efficacy toward cybersecurity leads
to more assertive motivational behavior to comply with the security
policies.
In terms of self-efficacy, the findings from the previous studies report
a consistent result. Employees’ self-efficacy positively impacts their
intention to comply with cybersecurity policies. Therefore, employees’
self-efficacy is a strong predictor of cybersecurity protection action
(Herath & Rao, 2009b; Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; Ng & Xu, 2007;

Hypothesis 4b. Employees of a government agency have a higher
level of awareness of cybersecurity severity than employees in a business
5
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firm when encountering cybersecurity issues.

Table 2
Demographic information.

Generation Groups. A few studies on information security tested the
difference among age groups (Johnston & Warkentin, 2010; Knight &
Pearson, 2005). Knight and Pearson (2005) observed little difference
among the various age groups regarding computer behavior in the
workplace. In their study on e-commerce, Van Bavel et al. (2019)
showed that older adults are more vulnerable than younger adults to
certain types of the phishing attack. The younger people, especially Gen
Edges born after 1996, are less sensitive to cyber-attacks because they
were born in an information era and are more experienced internet users
than Baby Boomers, Generation X, and Millennials. Considering the
inconclusiveness of the age spectrum on the findings of cybersecurity
behavior, we have divided respondents into generation groups instead of
age groups. We intend to explore the cybersecurity behavior traits of
Baby Boomers, Generation X, Millennials, and Gen Edges. We expect
generation difference exists in their response to cybersecurity motiva
tional behavior. Therefore, we will test the following Hypothesis using
the ANOVA procedure.
Hypothesis 4c. People in the Gen Edge group have a lower level of
sensitivity toward cybersecurity severity than people in the groups of
Baby Boomer, Generation X, and Millennials when encountering
cybersecurity issues.
3. Research method
3.1. Data
A research instrument that focuses on work-related computer use
was sent to 800 employees in various organizations in a major city
located on the east coast of the US. The survey was distributed via local
business groups through the Internet in 2017. An initial invitation was
sent to business and government organizations in a large metropolitan
area in the Eastern US. One response was collected from each company.
The participants had administrative roles such as manager, director, vice
president, or president. Three hundred eighty-seven (387) employees
responded to the study, resulting in a 48.37% response rate. The de
mographic information of the respondents is presented in Table 2. Sixtyone percent of the respondents are female, and 39% are male. About
20% of the respondents are in the group of Gen Edge. The vast majority
of the participants (about 83%) have a college education. A little over
46% of the participants work for companies that have more than 500
employees.
The survey consisted of 32 items, including seven demographic
questions (See Appendix A). The items for this survey were selected and
designed to measure eight different theoretical constructs (see Table 3).
Participants responded to each question by choosing a 7-point Likert
scale ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree. After
completing the survey items, participants completed a demographic
questionnaire.

Gender

Frequency (N = 387)

Percent (%)

Male
Female
Age
Gen Edge
Millennial
Generation X
Baby Boomer
Education background
High school
undergraduate
graduate
Job function area
Accounting
Administration
Information Technology
Instructions/Teaching
R&D
Operations
Marketing and Sales
Others
Organization category
Government
Education
Finance/Banking/Insurance
Information Technology
Retail/wholesale
Real estate
Telecommunications
Healthcare/Medical
Military
Others
Organization size
1–50
51–500
>501
Annual revenue
Less than $1 million
>$1 million-$100 million
>$100 million and more
I don’t know

149
238

38.50
61.50

75
235
47
30

19.38
60.72
12.14
7.75

65
271
51

16.80
70.03
13.18

18
63
65
62
17
46
86
30

4.65
16.28
16.80
16.02
4.39
11.89
22.22
7.75

35
129
11
30
58
34
6
39
17
28

9.04
33.33
2.84
7.75
14.99
8.79
1.55
10.08
4.39
7.24

118
93
176

30.49
24.03
45.48

61
64
44
218

15.76
16.54
11.37
56.33

employee cybersecurity behavior. In addition, an extensive literature
review on each construct specified in the conceptual model (Fig. 1 and
Table 1) and recent media reports on cybersecurity (Bay Dynamics,
2016; Infographic, 2016; McMillan et al., 2021) have helped define the
scope of the study and objectively test the research instrument.
Construct reliability. Cronbach’s Alpha was used to assess the in
ternal consistency of the items for each construct (Table 3). The threat
appraisal process was measured using two constructs as suggested in
Rogers’ Protection Motivation Theory (Rogers, 1983): perceived
severity and perceived vulnerability with the reliability of 0.83 and
0.84, respectively. The coping process has three constructs: response
efficacy, self-efficacy, and response costs. Reliabilities for these three
constructs are 0.82, 0.87, and 0.73, respectively. Finally, reliabilities for
organizational effort, action experience, and security protection action
are 0.81, 0.78, and 0.72, respectively (Table 3). As such, Cronbach alpha
values have all exceeded the suggested threshold of 0.60. This result
presents evidence of effective measurement of security protection
constructs.
Next, we tested the construct reliability of our constructs by con
ducting a Confirmatory Factory Analysis (CFA). This measurement
model was supported by a number of statistical fit indices as shown in
Table 3: Chi-square/df = 1.95, RMSEA = 0.05, CFI = 0.95, GFI = 0.90,
and IFI = 0.95. The fit indices from our measurement model meet the
commonly acceptable statistical fit indices of 0.90. In addition, each of
the standardized loadings (indicated under the column of “Loading” in
Table 3) for the model paths was highly significant. In summary, each of
the proposed constructs that we intended to measure in our survey
revealed evidence of good internal consistency and measurement model

3.2. Analysis
3.2.1. Measurement model, construct reliability and validity
The survey was designed to measure eight latent constructs related to
the hypotheses proposed above. Therefore, we began our analyses by
investigating the construct reliability and validity of the measurement
model of the survey items.
Content validity. Generally speaking, content validity refers to
whether a research instrument appropriately applies the theoretical
constructs to the target domain of the research theme. In this case,
content validity was established through discussions with employees
from various industries, including retailing, financial services, health
care, telecommunication, military, information technology, govern
ment, etc. to learn the behavioral components related to cybersecurity
cues to action, threat appraisal process, coping appraisal process, and
6
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Table 3
Confirmatory factor analysis.
Indicator
Organization Effort (OE)
OE1
OE2
OE3
Action Experience(AE)
AE1
AE2
AE3
Perceived Severity(PS)
PS1
PS2
PS3
Perceived Vulnerability(PV)
PV1
PV2
PV3
PV4
Response Efficacy(RE)
RE1
RE2
RE3
Self-efficacy(SE)
SE1
SE2
SE3
Response Cost (RC)
RC1
RC2
RC3
Security Protection Action (SPA)
SPA1
SPA2
SPA3

R2

Loading
(Standardized Regression Weights)

S.E.

Total variance explained (%)

0.78***
0.91***
0.63***

0.09
0.08
0.09

0.61
0.82
0.40

0.62***
0.72***
0.91***

0.10
0.08
0.09

0.38
0.51
0.82

0.66***
0.76***
0.96***

0.11
0.09
0.09

0.44
0.58
0.91

0.76***
0.76***
0.70***
0.78***

0.08
0.08
0.06
0.07

0.58
0.58
0.49
0.61

0.82***
0.84***
0.68***

0.06
0.05
0.05

0.68
0.70
0.46

0.72***
0.85***
0.92***

0.08
0.09
0.08

0.52
0.73
0.85

0.66***
0.74***
0.66***

0.10
0.10
0.10

0.43
0.55
0.44

0.71***
0.59***
0.76***

0.08
0.06
0.08

0.50
0.35
0.58

Cronbach

AVE (Average Variance Extracted)

α
72.88

0.81

0.61

70.05

0.78

0.57

74.86

0.83

0.64

67.14

0.84

0.56

73.75

0.82

0.61

79.05

0.87

0.70

64.71

0.73

0.47

64.59

0.72

0.48

Note: *** significant at 0.001; χ2 = 482, χ2/DF = 1.95, CFI = 0.95, GFI = 0.90, IFI = 0.95, RMESA = 0.05.

fit, suggesting that our data provide acceptable levels of measurement
reliability (Hair et al., 2006).
The explained variance for the security protection action is 0.72,
meaning that 72% of the variance is captured by the cognitive mediating
process that includes perceived cybersecurity severity, perceived
vulnerability, response efficacy, self-efficacy, and response cots.
Convergent validity. The convergent validity method applies several
items for one scale, and each item in the same scale is viewed as a
different approach to assess the same construct. Anderson and Gerbing
(1988) suggest that convergent validity can be measured using t-tests for
the factor loadings. If all factor loadings for the same construct are
statistically significant, then this suggests acceptable convergent val
idity of the items on a scale. The results of CFA in Table 3 confirm that all
paths between observed variables and the first-order latent variables are
at the significant level of p < 0.001. For example, three items loaded to
the construct “perceived severity” under the column with the heading
“Loading” in Table 3 are statistically significant at p < 0.001, indicating
all items are effectively assessing perceived severity. Another way to
assess the convergent validity of items on a scale is by examining the
magnitude of the factor loadings. Table 3 shows the factor loadings of
each item on the proposed scale exceed 0.50. The results indicate that
the measurements in our model have good convergent validity. Finally,
in this eight-factor CFA model, the total variance explained by each
construct is in the range of 47%–70% (Table 3). Hence, we claim that the
convergent validity of our model is satisfactory.
Discriminant validity. Discriminant validity refers to whether
different scales in a model actually measure different constructs. If two
scales are both measuring the same or highly similar constructs, then
this could be the cause of strong correlations between factors in a model.
The discriminant validity of the eight constructs was assessed by
computing the correlations between validated constructs (Table 4).
Correlations between all pairs of constructs are below the recommended

threshold value of 0.90 (Hair et al., 2006). Furthermore, the average
variance extracted (AVE) from all the constructs (Table 3) exceeds the
threshold of 0.5 except response costs (RC) and cybersecurity protection
action (SPA) with AVE values that are very close to 0.5. This result in
dicates that discriminant validity is acceptable, and correlations be
tween the measures of constructs are not strong enough to suggest that
the different scales are multiple measurements of the same construct.
3.3. Structural equation model testing
Structural Equation Modeling (SEM) was used to test our proposed
theoretical model of the mediating role of PMT cognitive factors in the
relationship between organizational efforts and employee protection
actions. SEM follows a two-step approach that includes constructing the
measurement model and testing the structural model (Anderson &
Gerbing, 1988). Specifically, we have tested our proposed Extended
Protection Motivation Model and assessed the overall fit using the
maximum likelihood method in AMOS. The test of the structural model
includes estimating the path coefficients, which indicate the strength of
the relationships between the independent and dependent variables, and
the R2 values, which are the amount of variance explained by the in
dependent variables. The final structural equation model that includes
all paths is shown in Fig. 2, and the complete set of relationships for the
final model is listed in Fig. 2 and Table 5.
Fit statistics SEM. The fit indices chosen for our model represent two
characteristics: (i) the global fit measures and (ii) comparative fit mea
sures. The chi-square test (χ2) with degrees of freedom is commonly used
as the global model fit criteria. The chi-square value of our structural
equation model is 610, and χ2/df is 2.31 (Table 5), which is a very good
result based on the acceptable ratio of χ2/df = 2.5 or smaller. We choose
the comparative fit index (CFI), the goodness of fit index (GFI), incre
mental fit index (IFI), and root mean square error of approximation
7
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Table 4
Correlation matrix of constructs.
Action Experience (AE)
Perceived Vulnerability (PV)
Perceived Severity (PS)
Response Cost (RC)
Response Efficacy (RE)
Organization Effort (OE)
Self-efficacy (SE)
Security Protection Action (SPA)

Mean

Std. Deviation

AE

PV

PS

RC

RE

OE

SE

SPB

4.79
5.03
4.68
3.60
5.52
4.01
4.26
5.63

1.55
1.29
1.82
1.48
0.98
1.61
1.72
1.13

1.00
.506**
.145**
-.121*
.351**
.630**
.319**
.278**

1.00
.276**
-.114*
.535**
.393**
.151**
.268**

1.00
0.08
.199**
.187**
− 0.09
0.06

1.00
-.200**
− 0.07
-.132**
-.273**

1.00
.314**
0.08
.323**

1.00
.207**
.186**

1.00
.474**

1.00

Note: N = 387; **: significant at p < 0.01(2-tailed); *: significant at p < 0.05 (2-tailed).

Fig. 2. Structural equation model.

(Fig. 1) provides a good overall fit of the data. The variables and con
structs represented in the model explain a considerable portion of the
variance in the endogenous constructs. In the next section, findings
related to hypotheses regarding the individual paths in the model will be
discussed.

Table 5
Fit statistics for measurement and structural models.
Measurement Model Goodness of Fit Statistics

Model Value

χ2

482
247
1.95
0.05
0.946
0.904
0.946
Model Value

df

χ2/DF

Root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA)
Comparative fit index (CFI)
Goodness-of-fit index (GFI)
Incremental fit index (IFI)
Structural Model Goodness of Fit Statistics

χ2
df

2

χ /DF

Root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA)
Comparative fit index (CFI)
Goodness-of-fit index (GFI)
Incremental fit index (IFI)

4. Findings related to hypotheses
The hypotheses in the extended PMT model test the relationships
among organization effort, employee’s experience of cybersecurity
protection, the threat appraisal process (perceived severity and
perceived vulnerability), the coping appraisal process (response effi
cacy, self-efficacy, and response costs), and an employee’s cybersecurity
protection actions. The results of our study have supported eleven hy
potheses proposed in Section 2. Table 6 presents a summary of the hy
potheses testing result for the structural model.
The first Hypothesis tests the effects of organizational effort on em
ployees’ cybersecurity awareness. We hypothesized (H1) that organi
zational efforts (i.e., circulating security newsletters, providing security
training, and distributing security alert messages/emails) are positively
related to employee awareness (i.e., security training experience and
understanding their company’s information security policy). The result
of our study supports this hypothesis. Table 6 shows that the standard
ized path coefficient between organization efforts and employee action

610
264
2.31
0.058
0.92
0.88
0.92

(RMSEA) to assess the congruence between the hypothesized model and
the data. The comparative fit index for our extended PMT model is
CFI = 0.92, GFI = 0.88, IFI = 0.92, and RMSEA = 0.058. All the values
have a satisfactory fit of 0.90, except GFI, which has a fit index of 0.88,
close to the generally accepted minimum norm of 0.90. These results
suggest that overall the proposed Extended Protection Motivation Model
8
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security protection action (Hypotheses H3a and H3b) is positive but not
statistically significant. Detailed discussion is provided in section 6.

Table 6
Summary of hypotheses testing result for the structural model.

H1
H2a
H2b
H2c
H2d
H2e
H3a
H3b
H3c
H3d
H3e

Paths

Standard path
coefficient

p-value

Organization Effort → Action Experience
Action Experience → Perceived Severity
Action Experience → Perceived
Vulnerability
Action Experience → Response efficacy
Action Experience → Self-efficacy
Action Experience → Response Cost
Perceived Severity → Security
Protection Action
Perceived Vulnerability → Security
Protection Action
Response Efficacy → Security Protection
Action
Self-efficacy → Security Protection
Action
Response Costs → Security Protection
Action

γ1 = 0.79
β1 = 0.22
β2 = 0.62

<0.001
<0.001
<0.001

β3
β4
β5
β6

= 0.47
= 0.29
= − 0.14
= 0.06

5. Testing the effects of demographic factors
5.1. Gender difference - multi-group structural model comparison
While an overall perspective on our extended PMT model shows
significant relationships among eight constructs, we would like to
explore further the moderating impact of gender by establishing com
parison groups. Hypothesis 4a is tested using this procedure.
When analyzing the differences in cybersecurity behavior based on
gender, we prefer the structural model parameter comparison procedure
to the ANOVA procedure because the structural model parameter
comparison builds upon the measurement invariance test and then
performs similar types of comparisons to assess the differences in path
loadings in the structural model (a feature that ANOVA does not pro
vide). We first test whether the metric invariance exists in the mea
surement model, and then analyze the differences of paths based on the
comparison of the unconstrained model and the constrained model.
We divided our sample into male employees (n = 149) and female
employees (n = 238) based on the responses in the survey. The results
from the measurement invariance test (Table 7) show that the change in
chi-square (Δχ2) is 37 with a change in degrees of freedom (ΔDF) of 25
between the unconstrained group model and constrained group model
for males and females. This result indicates that the difference is not
significant at p ≤ 0.05, which supports the full metric invariance com
parison between male and female participants. Thus, we select gender as
the moderator to conduct the structural model comparison. We further
analyze the difference of paths in gender based on the comparison of the
unconstrained model and the constrained model to provide a clearer
picture of the behavioral difference between the male and female groups
when they encounter cybersecurity issues.
The results from the gender analysis show an acceptable fit, χ2/
df = 1.8 (Table 8), RMSEA = 0.046, and CFI = 0.9; therefore, the overall
comparison model is acceptable. The χ2 difference between the uncon
strained and constrained structural models is 15, with a change in the
degree of freedom of 7, which indicates that the difference between the
two models is significant.
This result suggests that gender does moderate cybersecurity
behavior to a certain degree. Two path loadings, the relationship be
tween employee awareness and perceived severity (EA→PS), and
response cost and security protection action (RC→SPA) are significant at
p < 0.001 contingent on gender (Table 8).
Further examining the standardized parameter estimates for the
unconstrained model, we find that both EA→PS and RC→SPA paths are
significant in the female group but not in the male group, which means
that the association between employee awareness and perceived
severity, and between response cost and security protection action are
more substantial for female employees than for male employees.
Furthermore, the effect of response efficacy on security protection
behavior is stronger in the female group (p < 0.001) than in the male
group (p < 0.05), though both groups show a level of significance in this
pair of interactions. Therefore, Hypothesis 4a, Women have a higher level
of awareness of cybersecurity severity than men when encountering cyber
security issues,” is, at least, partially supported by these results. Our study
suggests that previous inconclusive findings on the information security
behavior between male and female employees are due to the aggregated
information; when the data are broken down to detailed analysis,
behavioral differences emerge.

<0.001
<0.001
<0.05
>0.5

β7 = 0.05

>0.5

β8 = 0.26

<0.001

β9 = 0.52

<0.001

β10 = − 0.24

<0.001

experience is γ1 = 0.79 with a p-value < 0.001.
The next set of two hypotheses (hypotheses H2a and H2b) tested the
relationship between employees’ cyber security awareness and the
threat appraisal process, including perceived severity and perceived
vulnerability. We hypothesized (H2a) that Employees’ awareness posi
tively related to their perceived severity of cybersecurity incidents.
Table 6 shows that the standardized path coefficient for H2a is β1 = 0.22
with a p-value < 0.001. Therefore, H2a is supported. Hypothesis H2b,
“Employee’s awareness is positively associated with their perceived
vulnerability caused by cybersecurity incidents,” is supported by
β2 = 0.62 and a p-value <0.001. The results indicate that cybersecurity
awareness training for employees helps address one of the biggest fac
tors in major security breaches: the role humans play in preventing
cyber-attack. By training employees to recognize and respond to cyber
threats, organizations can improve their security posture and cyber
resilience. Furthermore, employees are better aware of the severe
consequence of computer viruses, opening a suspicious email attach
ment, and losing data resulting from hacking.
The three hypotheses (hypotheses H2c, H2d, and H2e) test the
relationship between employees’ cybersecurity awareness and the
coping appraisal process, including response efficacy, self-efficacy, and
response cost. The results of structural equation analysis support all
three hypotheses. The standardized path coefficient for H2c is β3 = 0.47
and for H2d is β4 = 0.29, both are with a p-value < 0.001. Hypotheses
H2e has a negative path coefficient β5 = − 0.14, with a p-value < 0.05.
This result is preferred and confirms the previous findings on response
costs (Boss et al., 2015). The higher the employees’ awareness, the less
cost or inconvenience they would incur when performing cybersecurity
tasks. The results also indicate that when organizations provide training,
distribute security awareness newsletters, and invite experts to give talks
on security protection, they provide their employees with a working
knowledge of efficacy to cope with cyber intrusion.
Hypothesis 3 (H3a, H3b, H3c, H3d, and H3e) tests the relationship
between mediating factors (including threat appraisal process and
coping appraisal process) and employee’s cybersecurity motivational
behavior. The finding of our study supports hypothesis 3. The stan
dardized coefficients of β8 = 0.26, β9 = 0.52 β10 = − 0.24, all are sig
nificant at p < 0.001 (Fig. 2 and Table 6). The result indicates that
response efficacy and self-efficacy increase are positively related to
employees’ cybersecurity protection behavior. Furthermore, when an
employee’s awareness improves, the response cost reduces (H2e), and
the lower the response cost leads to better employee protection behavior
(H3e). This result confirms the previous findings on response costs in the
research on information security (Boss et al., 2015) and the research on
the PMT model in general.
The mediating power of the cybersecurity threat appraisal process on

5.2. Generation groups - ANOVA and post hoc analysis
Next, we conduct the Analysis of Variance (ANOVA) procedure to
investigate (i) the difference among the four generations regarding se
curity protection actions (H4c). Our sample includes four different
9
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Table 7a
Measurement invariance test.
Unconstrained group Model (Configurable invariance)

Group

2

Gender

2

Constrained Group Model (Metric invariance)
2

Gender

Df

χ /Df

CFI

RMSEA

χ

Df

χ /Df

CFI

RMSEA

Δχ2

ΔDf

811

494

1.6

0.9

0.04

848

519

1.6

0.9

0.04

37

25

Unconstrained group
Model (Configurable
invariance)

Partial Constrained
Group Model (Metric
invariance)

Model
Differences

χ2

Df

χ2/Df

χ2

Df

χ2/Df

Δχ2

ΔDf

811

494

1.6

837

513

1.6

26

19

Millennials, and Gen Edge rated employee awareness and perceived
vulnerability lower than that of Generation X (Fig. 3). Thus, Hypothesis
4c, “Different generations behave differently when encountering
cybersecurity issues,” is supported. This is the first time when genera
tions, rather than age groups, are used as an independent variable to
assess employees’ cybersecurity actions. Future research should pay
more attention to the difference in generations to develop cybersecurity
strategies tailored to different generations.
5.3. The difference in types of organizations

Table 8
Testing for gender as a moderator in the structural model.
Model
Characteristic

Unconstrained Group
Model (Configurable
invariance)

Constrained Group
Model (Metric
invariance, AE→PS,
AE→PV, AE→RE,
AE→RC, PV→SPA,
RE→SPA, & RC→ SPA
Equal Across Groups)

Model
Differences

χ2

Df
χ2/Df
CFI
RMSEA

957
528
1.8
0.9
0.046

972
535
1.8
0.9
0.046

15
7
–
–
–

Path estimate
(PAE, PS)
Path estimate
(PAE, PV)
Path estimate
(PAE, RE)
Path estimate
(PAE, RC)
Path estimate
(PPV, SPA)
Path estimate
(PRE, SPA)
Path estimate
(PRC, SPA)

0.29***(female),
0.18 (male)
0.62***(female),
0.64***(male)
0.38***(female),
0.70***(male)
− 0.14 (female),
− 0.19(male)
− 0.01(female), 0.15
(male)
0.29***(female),
0.27**(male)
− 0.29***(female),
− 0.17 (male)

0.22***(combined)

Model fit

Model Differences

χ

Table 7b
Measurement invariance test (partial constrained).
Group

2

The sample is divided into two groups based on the survey responses,
business (n = 352) and government (n = 35). A paired tt-test result
shows that the two groups behave differently based on the eight con
structs at p < 0.10. Fig. 4 indicates a significant difference between the
two groups; therefore, Hypothesis 4b, " Employees of a government agency
have a higher level of awareness of cybersecurity severity than employees in a
business firm when encountering cybersecurity issues,” is supported.
Hair et al. (2006, p.174) indicated that researchers use levels ranging
from 0.01 (most demanding) to 0.10 (less conservative). Therefore, we
would like to remind the readers that p < 0.10 is a less conservative
significant level.
6. Discussion
Since the efficacy of our proposed extended PMT model has been
established, we would like to discuss our contributions to research and
theory in the context of the research opportunities. This study evaluates
the relationship between employees’ cybersecurity awareness and the
improvement of their motivational behavior, provides several valuable
findings, and suggests a few theoretical implications and practical pre
scriptions. In the following section, we discuss theoretical contributions,
practical applications, and policy implications.

0.62***(combined)
0.47***(combined)
− 0.14**(combined)
0.05 (combined)
0.26***(combined)
− 0.24***(combined)

6.1. Theory-building contribution and predictive power of mediating
factors

Note: **: significant at p < 0.05; ***: significant at p < 0.001.

This study makes three key theoretical contributions to the literature
of cybersecurity research. First, our proposed conceptual model explains
how cybersecurity protection action can change in response to security
threats and coping behavior. The predictive power of the behavioral
mediating factors (i.e., cybersecurity threat appraisal process and threat
coping appraisal process) indicates the importance of organization effort
on the changes in employee’s security protective actions. The results of
this study have provided a clear answer to the contradictory findings in
the prior research regarding employees’ perceived threats and responses
when they are facing cybersecurity issues.
Secondly, the role of mediating factors in predicting cybersecurity
protection actions has been confirmed in the information security study.
Though employees’ prior security action experience is associated with
the security threat appraisal process, it does not significantly affect se
curity protection. On the other hand, the coping appraisal process,
which indicates the ability to avert the malicious threat, is the most
important mediator for employees’ cybersecurity protection action. The
output of the coping appraisal-mediating process illustrates the predic
tive power for employee cybersecurity protection action. We believe
that this is the first few studies that the role of the appraisal-mediating
process in the cybersecurity study has been tested and reported. The

generations: Baby Boomers, Generation X, Millennial, and Gen Edge.
People of each generation behave differently when they view the issues
related to cybersecurity. Therefore, we split the sample into four sub
groups (Table 2): Gen Edge (n = 75), Millennial (n = 235), Generation X
(n = 47), and Baby Boomers (n = 30). The sample size reflects the
current workforce age distribution. In 2021,1 baby boomers are 57–75
years old, and many have already retired. Employees in the Generation X
group are between 42 andto 56 years old, while millennials are 25–41
years old and are most productive. Gen Edges are 24 years old or
younger, and most of them have not entered the workforce yet.
The results from ANOVA (Table 9) show significant differences
among the four generations in employee awareness, perceived vulner
ability, self-efficacy, and security protection behavior. Tukey’s post hoc
analysis further indicates that Gen Edge rated the Cyber Security Pro
tection Action construct lower than the other three groups. Additionally,
Gen Edge rated employee awareness and self-efficacy lower than that of

1
Check this link for age groups https://www.ivyinvestments.com/advisor-re
sources/genlink/generation-edge.
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Table 9
Generations - ANOVA and post hoc test (tukey HSD).
Constructs

ANOVA

Post Hoc Tests (Multiple Comparisons)

Between Groups
OE
EA
PS
PV
RE
SE
RC
SPA

GenEdge - Millenial

GenEdge - Generation X

GenEdge - BabyBoomer

Mean

F

Sig.

Mean Difference

Sig.

Mean Difference

Sig.

Mean Difference

Sig.

4.009
4.788
4.677
5.025
5.518
4.256
3.596
5.630

1.492
7.917
0.842
4.938
1.750
4.562
1.126
8.205

0.216
0.000
0.472
0.002
0.156
0.004
0.338
0.000

− 0.139
-.83,110*
− 0.267
− 0.280
− 0.175
-.67,162*
0.357
-.65,604*

0.914
0.000
0.687
0.345
0.532
0.016
0.267
0.000

− 0.591
− 1.16161*
− 0.493
-.83,390*
− 0.409
− 0.650
0.302
-.85,553*

0.198
0.000
0.468
0.003
0.113
0.169
0.692
0.000

− 0.340
− 0.351
− 0.422
− 0.655
− 0.247
0.160
0.343
-.62,033*

0.761
0.704
0.707
0.081
0.647
0.972
0.707
0.047

Note: Age include 4 subgroups.
* The mean difference is significant at the 0.05 level.

cyber threats and employee awareness in this study) are found to be
significantly associated with the appraisal processes. Organization ef
forts are an essential antecedent for implementing information security
policies because these efforts are the source of conviction that em
ployees can reference when they decide to engage in security protection
actions. Employee prior experience is an important precondition for
information security behavioral change since it determines the initiation
of coping behavior.
6.2. Practical applications and some prescriptions
Based on demographic information, the outcome of this research
highlights three implications for security policy compliance in organi
zations from a practical view.
First, our result indicates that gender difference exists in the area of
cybersecurity protection behavior. Previous research did not offer a
conclusive finding. Therefore, this study adopts a multi-group structural
model to investigate the moderating effects of gender on the relationship
hypothesized in the structural model (Fig. 2). A couple of significant
differences between participants who identified as male or female pro
vide insight for future employee cybersecurity training. For example,
women view cybersecurity awareness experience as a stronger ante
cedent to the perceived severity of data loss due to hacking, computer
virus, and unauthorized access to information than men do.
Additionally, women view checking email attachments, checking
privacy settings on social media, and backing up a dataset regularly
(response cost) as less costly than men did. Therefore, we would like to
suggest that future security training materials for male employees
should emphasize the importance of action experience to alert the
awareness of perceived severity. Moreover, it is essential for male em
ployees to understand that response cost is an opportunity cost in
cybersecurity protection. When an employee takes on some inconve
nient activities, such as backing up computer systems or checking pri
vacy settings, he improves his cybersecurity protection level.
Second, there is a difference between business and government or
ganizations at the cybersecurity protection level. For example, in the US,
government organizations have formulated detailed and clear guidelines
on things federal employees should do and should not do regarding
cybersecurity protective behavior (Federal Mobility Group, 2020), while
business firms, though they have security compliance policies, do not
have as strict rules as that of the government (i.e., can’t print company’s
materials at home). The US federal government has shared the best
cybersecurity practices for teleworking and using video collaboration
tools with government employees and business workers (Federal
Mobility Group, 2020). These best practices have improved employees’
response efficacy and self-efficacy to work safely and securely online. As
a result, employees are motivated to take on some inconvenient activ
ities, such as backing up computer systems, updating passwords to
protect the integrity of their organization’s information system.

Fig. 3. Generation groups and mediating factors.

Fig. 4. Government vs. Business and Mediating Factors; tt-test p < 0.1.

viable dependent variable in research on the extended PMT is the
measure of motivational behavior rather than intension, as seen in the
previous study. This finding extends and adds a theoretical implication
to the PMT model.
Third, the antecedent factors (organization effort in combatting
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Third, the effect of generation difference on perceived threat and
security coping strategy has been tested for the first time in this study.
Previous studies used age groups as an independent variable to predict
employee security protection intention. We suggest that generation
groups would be a better predictor because the Gen Edge treats tech
nology as a natural extension of their physical body compared with the
other generations. People in the Gen Edge group were born after 1996.
The oldest people in the Gen Edge group will be 25 years in 2021. They
think and process information differently from those in the Baby Boomer
group, Generation X group, and Millennials. Prensky (2001) named
them Digital Natives because they are “native speakers” of the digital
language of computers, video games, and the Internet. The other gen
eration groups who were not born into the digital world but have
learned new technologies later are “digital immigrants.”
The results of our study indicate that Gen Edge shows a significant
difference from that of other generations in the mediating constructs
(Fig. 3). They rated cybersecurity awareness experience, perceived
severity, and perceived vulnerability lower than the other three gen
eratons. On the contrary, they view the costs of conducting preventive
actions (i.e., response cost) higher than the perceived benefits compared
with those of the other three groups. That means that they will back up
their computer systems less frequently, pay less attention to unautho
rized access of information, etc. As such, their security motivational
action is scored lower than that of the other three generations. We
suggest that future training should enhance the cybersecurity awareness
of the Gen Edge generation, who will be the viable working force
contributing to economic development in the near future.

cybersecurity protection actions and makes three key theoretical con
tributions to the literature of cybersecurity research. First, the proposed
conceptual model provides an understanding of how cybersecurity
protection action can change in response to security threats and coping
behavior. Secondly, the role of mediating factors in predicting cyber
security motivational actions has been confirmed. Third, the antecedent
factors (organization effort in combatting cyber threats and employee
awareness in this study) are found to be significantly associated with the
cybersecurity threat and coping appraisal processes.
The extended PMT paradigm proposed in this study offers a pre
scriptive model to improve the effectiveness of cybersecurity fear ap
peal. Several practical prescriptions are suggested. First, due to the
behavioral differences between male and female employees, future se
curity training materials should emphasize the importance of action
experience to alert male employees’ awareness of the perceived severity
of cyber threats. Secondly, government organizations tend to have a
higher level of cybersecurity protection actions. Therefore, we suggest
that government organizations share their experience in cybersecurity
protection with business firms and help businesses develop better in
formation security strategies. Third, future cybersecurity training ma
terials should adapt to the traits of different generations. For example,
Gen Edge is versatile with technology, but their awareness of the
severity of cybersecurity is lower than other generations. Therefore,
future training should focus on security awareness for employees who
are in the Gen Edge group.
The main limitations of this study are as follows: the respondents’
perceptions about their cybersecurity behaviors and practices were
measured based on their self-reported behavior. Therefore, the gener
alizability of the result is limited. Future research can employ different
data collection methods to collect respondents’ actual cybersecurity
behaniors, such as the experiment design approach that Van Bavel et al.
(2019) used to study online purchasing. Other limitations include the
sample size difference when we studied government organizations and
business firms. Future research may further analyze the moderating ef
fect of organization type on cybersecurity motivational behavior.
Additionally, it is the first time generation groups are used as an inde
pendent variable to test the impact of generation identity on cyberse
curity behavior. Future research should explore the underlying causes of
the moderating effect of respective generations found in this study.
Research instruments regarding the cybersecuiryt behavior of Digital
natives in the Gen Edge group should be developed to understand what
they think and how they behave.

6.3. Policy implications
A valuable policy implication that the results of this study suggest is
the process that ensures the implementation of cybersecurity policy in
organizations. The awareness of an organization’s information security
policy is related to employees’ cognitive behavior and protective ac
tions. To our knowledge, this finding has not been explicitly tested in
previously published research. Developing a cybersecurity policy is not
enough; the process that helps educate and maintain employees’
awareness to implement the existing security policy is an integral part of
a cybersecurity protection plan. Employees who are aware of cyberse
curity policy behave significantly differently than employees who are
unaware of security policy or employees of a company that does not
have a security policy in place. We recommend that organizations
develop a process that reminds employees of their essential and personal
obligations, just as airline pilots and school bus drivers have to take
breath tests before driving to ensure they can safely use their profes
sional equipment.
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Appendix A
Constructs (Symbol)

Questions

Organization Effort (OE)
OE1
OE2
OE3
Employee’s Security
Awareness (AE)
AE1
AE2
AE3

(Key reference and adapted from Herath & Rao, 2009a)
My organization distributes security newsletters or articles.
My organization organizes security talks and training.
My organization’s Information Technology helpdesk sends out alert messages/emails concerning security.
(Key reference and adapted from Ajzen, 2011; Herath & Rao, 2009a; IBM Security, 2020)
I had formal training on standard computer security practices.
The organization I worked for had an established information security policy.
The organization I worked for has provided employees with information security training.
(continued on next page)
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(continued )
Constructs (Symbol)

Questions

Perceived Severity (PS)

(Key reference and adapted from Ali et al., 2021; Boss et al., 2015; Floyd et al., 2000; Herath & Rao, 2009a; Rogers, 1983; Wall & Warkentin,
2019; Wu, 2020; Yoo et al., 2021)
Having my computer infected by a virus as a result of opening a suspicious email attachment is a severe problem for me.
At work, having my confidential information accessed by someone without my consent or knowledge is a severe problem for me.
Loss of data resulting from hacking is a severe problem for me.
(Key reference and adapted from Ali et al., 2021; Boss et al., 2015; Herath and Rao, 2009a; Lee & Larsen, 2009; Ng et al., 2007; Wall & Warkentin,
2019; Wu, 2020; Yoo et al., 2021)
I feel that my organization could become vulnerable to security breaches if I don’t adhere to its information security policy.
I feel that I could fall victim to a malicious attack if I fail to comply with my organization’s information security policy.
I believe that my effort to protect my organization’s information will reduce illegal access to it.
My organization’s data and resources may be compromised if I don’t pay adequate attention to information security policies and guidelines.
(Key reference and adapted from Ali et al., 2021; Boss et al., 2015; Crossler & Bélanger, 2014; Wall & Warkentin, 2019; Wu, 2020; Yoo et al.,
2021)
Complying with the information security policies in my organization will keep security breaches down.
If I comply with information security policies, the chance of information security breaches occurring will be reduced.
Careful compliance with information security policies helps to avoid security problems.
(Key reference and adapted from Ali et al., 2021; Boss et al., 2015; Crossler & Bélanger, 2014; Herath & Rao, 2009a; Wall & Warkentin, 2019; Wu,
2020; Yoo et al., 2021)
I feel confident in setting the Web browser to different security levels.
I feel confident in handling virus-infected files.
I feel confident in getting rid of spyware and malware from my computer.
(Key reference and adapted from Ali et al., 2021; Boss et al., 2015; Crossler & Bélanger, 2014; Herath & Rao, 2009a; Menard et al., 2017)
It is inconvenient to check the security of an email with attachments.
Changing the privacy setting on social media sites is inconvenient.
Backing up a computer regularly is inconvenient.
(Key reference and adapted from Boss et al., 2015; Floyd et al., 2000; Wall & Warkentin, 2019)

PS1
PS2
PS3
Perceived Vulnerability(PV)
PV1
PV2
PV3
PV4
Response Efficacy (RE)
RE1
RE2
RE3
Self-Efficacy (SE)
SE1
SE2
SE3
Response Cost (RC)
RC1
RC2
RC3
Security Protection Behavior
(SPB)
SPB1
SPB2
SPB3

I keep the anti-virus software on my computer up-to-date.
I watch for unusual computer behaviors/responses (e.g., computer slowing down or freezing up, pop-up windows, etc.).
I always act on any malware alerts that I receive.

Note: There are eight constructs. Participants responded to the question by choosing a 7-point Likert scale ranging from Strongly Disagree to Strongly Agree.
Demographic Items
1. Gender
2. Age group
3. Education Background
4. Job function area
5. Organization category
6. Organization size
7. Annual revenue
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